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AN ESSAY FROM A PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE ON SCIENCE
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TUOMAS K. PERNU
Reality is multifactorial. “Everything affects 
everything”, we say. But we don’t really mean 
that. That is, what we mean, when we blurt 
something like that out, is that everything is 
“connected”, but what we don’t mean by that 
is that having a hold on some arbitrary thing 
results in having an equally good hold on any 
other thing. All of reality might be intercon-
nected, but that does not mean that each of 
those connections would provide us with an 
equally good means for manipulating reality.
From the perspective of philosophy of 
science, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
is particularly interesting precisely because 
it has made the fundamentally multifactori-
al nature of reality apparent and tangible to 
us all. What is striking about the pandemic, 
from this perspective, is that, not only can a 
variety of things be seen to have a bearing 
on the spread of the disease, but also that 
different ways of intervening on the spread 
of the disease result in a variety of conse-
quences, of which some are unintended and 
potentially negative. Most prominently, it is 
understood by everybody that while the 
various lockdown measures that have been 
implemented all over the world are an ef-
fective way to intervene on the spread of 
the disease (more specifically on the basic 
reproductive rate, R0, of SARS-CoV-2, the 
COVID-19 pathogen), the unintended – but 
unavoidable – consequences of implement-
ing such measures are psychologically, soci-
etally, economically and politically dramatic. 
We have witnessed a well-nigh complete, 
self-imposed shut-down of societies, and 
limiting of basic rights of liberal democracies, 
unprecedented in their history. Although 
the spread of the disease has become con-
tained by implementing these measures, it 
is understandable if one feels the need to 
question the price that has been payed – 
and that political controversy has ensued.
Put simply, the relationship between re-
ality and science can be described thus: re-
ality is messy, and it is the purpose of the 
scientific endeavour to make it sensible – to 
us. That is, it us, people, and our aims and 
our values that determine which parts of 
the messy, interconnected reality we should 
hold as particularly salient – really real, if you 
will. Some parts of reality are more useful to 
us, and therefore more worth tapping into, 
simply because by manipulating them we are 
able to induce changes in things that we find 
worth changing. Sometimes, however, no 
one particular such hinge can be identified, 
but there are many equally good ways of 
bringing about the wanted result – which is 
something that the discussion on the pos-
sible responses to COVID-19 has made 
apparent. But actually, more than that has 
become apparent: not only do we have a 
number of different ways of intervening on 
COVID-19 available to us, but it has also be-
come apparent that there are a number of 
different results we want, or could want, to 
bring about with such interventions. For ex-
ample, although the primary public focus has 
been on the COVID-19 death-rate – and 
the aim of public health measures has been 
assumed to be in reducing that number – 
several other parameters have appeared in 
the discussion (e.g. the rate of the infection 
(R0), confirmed number of cases in a popu-
lation, the number of hospitalised cases, the 
number of intensive care unit cases). Finding 
an answer to the question how should we 
respond to the pandemic is not hampered 
only by the fact that the pandemic is a result 
of multiple factors, but also by it being unclear 




Consider, for example, our focus on the 
death rate – the number of people dying of 
COVID-19. This is arguably an effect of the 
pandemic that is getting most of the public 
attention, and understandably so. However, 
the problem is that this number will not, 
by itself, tell us how exceptional and easily 
avoidable these deaths have been. And in-
deed, the more critical analyses have often 
shifted the focus from the death rate to 
the excessive death rate – to the number 
of people unexpectedly dying – in assess-
ing the severity of the pandemic. But even 
if we assumed that the notion of “exces-
sive death rate” were wholly unproblematic 
(which it is not, as it is all but clear what 
the right reference class for “excessive” is), 
it is apparent that the variation of such a 
variable is plagued by confounding factors 
– most notably by the very public health 
measures that were implemented to reduce 
the COVID-19 death rate. That is, striking 
about the COVID-19 pandemic is how our 
efforts to mitigate it might lead to worsening 
of the very issue we have tried to mitigate.
How to unravel this problem? The key 
conceptual insight is to apply more care in 
separating the relevant – but ultimately dif-
ferent – possible effect variables from each 
other. Let us call these target variables. A 
target variable is not a bare phenomenon 
of nature; target variables are determined 
by our choices – choices that we make on 
the basis of our values and purposes. Tar-
get variables are natural phenomena that 
we have an interest in manipulating. So, 
for example, death rate due to COVID-19 
in a given population, death rate due to 
COVID-19 in some proper subset of a given 
population, gross death rate in a given popu-
lation, the number of people hospitalised in 
a given population, the number of people in 
intensive care in a given population, or the 
gross national product of a given economy 
can all function as valid target variables in 
our efforts to mitigate the consequences 
of the pandemic (and indeed they all have 
appeared as such in public discussion). How-
ever, each of them is a different target vari-
able – and different in a very precise sense: 
they are differently responsive to our inter-
ventions. The death rate due to COVID-19 
in a population is responsive to applying 
COVID-19 lockdown measures to that 
population, for example, but the gross death 
rate in the same population might react in 
the opposite way (due, for example, the 
traffic-related deaths reducing dramatically).
We cannot escape the fact that the na-
ture is fundamentally multifactorial, and we 
cannot erase all the confounders having an 
effect on the variables that are of interest to 
us. What we can do, however, is to make it 
clearer to ourselves what kind of results we 
wish to achieve. And this, in turn, will guide 
us to focus our attention on those factors 
that will help us to achieve these results in 
the best (most accurate and robust) way. 
Let us call the variables that correspond 
to such factors as control variables. That 
is, we can assume that for each target vari-
able there exists a number (typically more 
than one) of control variables the variations 
of which are reliably correlated with varia-
tions of the target variable. And further, we 
can assume that we can give a precise or-
dering for such variables; that there exists, 
in other words, better and worse ways of 
controlling a given target variable. So, even 
if we admit that reality is fundamental-
ly multifactorial, we can still find more or 
less effective ways of harnessing it – given 
that we have first made it clear to ourselves 
what exactly we find worth harnessing.
Science in general can now be described as 
a pragmatic project which proceeds in two 
steps. First, a target variable is specified – a 
phenomenon that we (a variety of people 
engaging with the sciences) wish to measure 
and make amenable to our interventions. 
Second, a control variable is defined – a 
factor that corresponds to the given target 
variable in the best possible way. Consider 
now this view on science in the context of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Let us make the 
natural assumption that we want to prevent 
as many deaths from occurring as possible; 
every death is unwanted. We therefore 
have – prima facie at least – our eye on 
the gross death rate (in some population of 
interest): the lower the number of deaths, 
the better. Now, the problem, as it was al-
ready observed, is that the gross death rate 
pools together a variety of cases and is a 
result of numerous factors that are linked 
together. Suppose, then, that we want to 
aim our efforts at reducing the death rate 
due to COVID-19 (a proper subset of the 
gross death rate), and suppose that we im-
pose social distancing and other societal 
restrictions to achieve that end. Again, how-
ever, we are faced with unwanted results 
(of psychological, societal, and economic in 
nature): imposing such measures is not an 
optimal way of controlling the chosen tar-
get variable. But suppose a vaccine is de-
veloped; suppose, in other words, that we 
develop effective means for intervening 
on the very biological basis of COVID-19. 
Now it would seem we would have final-
ly found an optimal (accurate and robust) 
way of controlling the pandemic (with the 
proviso of possible unwanted side-effects 
of the vaccine). This is the reason why a 
COVID-19 vaccine is generally taken to be 
the ultimate way out of the pandemic – and 
why indeed we have developed bio-medical 
means of intervening on diseases in general.
We easily have an overly straightfor-
ward and omnipotent view on science. We 
should have trust in science, of course, and 
the recent rise in the public interest in the 
research related to the pandemic has been 
very welcome indeed – after the dark years 
of “alternative facts” and general distrust 
in science and the academia. But often the 
public discussion, and the wishes of the po-
litical decision-makers in particular, is based 
on a distorted view on science. There is a 
demand for control – for effective means of 
controlling the pandemic and all its reper-
cussions, and for someone to assume that 
control. Although science – in this case, par-
ticularly epidemiology and other bio-medical 
sciences – can help us to achieve our goals 
(to the extent that they are achievable), sci-
ence itself does not determine those goals. 
It is left for us – for the public discussion and 
political decision-makers – to decide what 
goals we want to pursue. Although this ap-
plies to science, and our relationship with 
it in general, we are often not conscious of 
it, as there is often no explicit conflict be-
tween the variety of goals that science can 
help us to achieve. What the COVID-19 
pandemic is a healthy (!) reminder of, how-
ever, is that such conflicts can, and often do, 
exist. A variety of tough decisions have had 
to be made, both at the level of frontline 
healthcare work, and at the level political 
decision-making. In doing so, the relevant 
sciences have been consulted to exhaus-
tion, and they have given us the best pos-
sible tools for controlling the course of the 
pandemic and mitigating its consequences. 
But what the sciences have not given us, are 
the values on the basis of which we choose 
to pursue one goal at the cost of another.
47

